Prospects for the Afghan interim government / Zalmay Khalilzad.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: Publication details: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 1991.Description: xv, 43 p. ; 30 cmISBN:
  • 833010751
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • Pamphlet DS 371.3 .K53 1991/ + /PDF/(2.55MB)

R-3949.

Rand library collection—Label on cover.

Includes bibliography—(p. 43).

Summary: With the departure of the Soviet troops—which was completed by February 15, 1989—there was widespread expectation that the Najib regime left behind in Kabul by the Soviets could collapse within twelve months. This expectation was based on several assumptions: (01). The regime was fragile and likely to fragment without the protective shield of the soviet forces; (02). The Soviet withdrawal would change the balance of power of power decisively in favor of the Mujahedin, resulting in increasing military successes against the regime; (03). The Soviet Union would seek only a decent interval between its troop withdrawal and the overthrow of the Najib government, and therefore would not provide significant assistance for the regime to prevent its ultimate overthrow—(p. v).

Contents: Preface—Summary—Acknowledgments—tables—I. Introduction : a brief history of the Afghan interim government—II. The formation of the AIG—III. A rebellion at the Shura—IV. Attitudes toward the AIG—V. The impact of the AIG—VI. Alternatives to the AIG—VII. Conclusion—Bibliography.