Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the indirect approach / Thomas H. Henriksen.

Abstract: "In exploring Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach, Dr. Thomas Henriksen assesses several cases where the United States has employed an Indirect Approach toward achieving strategic objectives, and he suggests where this concept has landed short of expectations. In the cases of Vietnam, Somalia, the Philippines, and other countries, he demonstrates that it is often difficult to fit the Indirect Approach doctrine into such a wide variety of strategic and operational environments. His historical narrative cautions against applying a universal model for an Indirect Approach in counterinsurgency (COIN) --for example, the ill-fated use of Montagnard tribes as surrogates in strike operations beyond their local self-defense missions. Moreover, mutual antagonisms between Montagnard and the South Vietnamese population hampered integration of the highland units into the central government's forces. There were difficulties in accommodating the Montagnard ways to the culture of ethnic Vietnamese. This is similar to the challenges of nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan where differing cultures are attempting to be blended into a working sense of nationhood. Just as the ethnic Vietnamese viewed with alarm the arming and training of the Montagnard people, the integrating of Sunni militias, the Sons of Iraq, into Iraq's security effort was an unpopular step in the eyes of Shia security officials."--P. vii.

English