Operation Moshtarak : lessons learned / The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS).
Material type:
TextPublication details: [London?] : The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), 2010.Description: 29 p. : maps, charts ; 30 cmSubject(s): DDC classification: - Pamphlet DS 371.413 .O64 2010/ + /PDF /(1.03MB)
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Books
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Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University | Pamphlet DS 371.413 .O64 2010/ + /PDF /(1.03MB) (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 21362 |
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Cover title.
“March 2010”.
“Refugees from Marjah, in Lashkar Gah”—cover page.
“The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)”—at head of title.
“Operation Moshtarak : lessons learned, May 2010”—header of pages.
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary: “NATO’s operation Moshtarak, launched in February 2010 in Helmand province, was the first deployment after the beginning of the much-debated surge of 30,000 additional US troops. It was billed as the largest military operation since the invasion of 2001. The planning for the operation emphasised the need the needs of Afghan people, and the importance of wining hearts and minds as part of a classic counter-insurgency operation. However, the reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric. Welcome improvements in the size and conduct of military operations were undermined by a lack of sufficient corresponding measures in the political and humanitarian campaigns…”—(p. 2).