Causes of the fall of the Islamic State of Afghanistan under Ustad Rabbani in Kabul : allal-e-suqut-e-daulat-e-Islami Afghanistan taht-e-qiade Ustad Rabbani dar Kabul / Syed ‘Allam-ud-Din Atseer ; translated by Sher Zaman Taizi ; edited by Syed Fida Yunas, Sitara-e-Shuja’at.

Includes bibliographical references.

Translated from Dari.

“Original text in Dari (translated into English and published in 2005)”—(p. [II]).

Contents: Descirption—Preface—Introduction—1. Formation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan : Background of the Islamic State of Afghanistan—2. Internal situation of the country—3. The legacy of the regime to the Islamic State—4. Condition of mujahideen a year before the fall of the regime—5. Activities of Hizb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami and the regime of Najib against each other after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops—6. Resignation of Najib (fall of the hired regime)—7. Factors that contributed to the fall of the Islamic government—8. Condition of administration in the beginning of the Islamic government—9. Moral conditions in the first year of the Islamic state—10. Robbery, barriers and barrier-keeping important events in the beginning of the mujahideen govt.—12. Shura-e-ahl-e-hal-o-‘aqd public opinion—13. Political situation in the last week of 1992 and the first month of 1993 AD—14. Ustad Rabbani and the problem of election of prime minister and formation of a cabinet—15. Fighting in the first month of 1993 AD—16. A few words about Mazar-e-Sharif in control of General Dostum—17. Causes of failure of the government of mujahideen (why the government of mujahideen did not succeed in Afghanistan?)—18. Ignorance of history—19. Awareness of the ‘turban and frock’ (alertness of revolutionaries)—20. Non-existence of national leadership—21. Fall of leadership in the hands of the army—22. Absence of national army—23. Inability for ostracism of tested unbelievers—24. Lack of consideration of national integrity—25. Indifference towards the spiritual leaders—26. Picking up of recognized personalities—27. Absence of the honest cadre—28. Lack of proper preparation for running the government—29. Existence of difficulties and internal opposition—30. Harmful advice of friends—31. Number of policy making bodies—32. Unmanageable national problems (rights of nationalities and tribes)—33. Ignorance of the warnings of history—34. Abandonment of the slogans of the time of jihad—35. Administrative weakness of the leaders—Endnotes.