Unconventional counterinsurgency : leveraging traditional social networks and irregular forces in remote and ungoverned areas : a monograph / by MAJ John D. Litchfield United States Army.

Litchfield, MAJ john D.
Kansas : School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010.
iii, 72 p. ; 30 cm.
Afghan War, 2001- .
Afghan War, 2001- – United States.
United States – Military policy.
United States – Armed Forces.
Special operations (Military science) – United States.
Counterinsurgency – United States.
Pamphlet DS 371.412 .L58 2010/ + /PDF/(537KB)
21541
Cover title.
“AY 2010”.
“School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army command and general staff college fort Leavenworth, Kansas”—cover page.
“Includes bibliography”—(p. 68-72).
Content: Introduction—Empowering the population to secure the government—Tribes and other traditional social networks—Traditional social networks in U.S. military doctrine—Irregular security forces in counterinsurgency—irregular forces in U.S. military doctrine—US army special forces and irregulars—Unconventional warfare : the capstone mission—Bridging the cap from unconventional warfare to counterinsurgency—Special forces, tribes and irregulars in remote area operations—Tribes and irregular forces in counterinsurgency strategy—Refocusing special forces to leverage traditional social networks and irregulars--
Conclusions—glossary—Bibliography.
Summary: “The conflicts that the United States is engaged in today are conflicts of identity, rooted in a historical and traditional narrative and worldview. The U.S. military needs an approach to counterinsurgency that pragmatically achieves short-term stability, while patiently continuing to work for long-term and enduring solutions that reflect our own beliefs, ideals and narrative. Special Forces have a unique capacity to contribute to that approach. This paper demonstrated the validity of two claims as the basis for its central argument : USSOCOM should refocus the counterinsurgency role of army special forces on leveraging traditional social networks and employing irregular security forces to expand host nation control and security in contested, ungoverned or insurgent controlled spaces”—(p. 59).